Loss Magnitude Rubric
- FAIR INTEL
- 4 days ago
- 12 min read
Updated: a few seconds ago

Based on Cyentia Institute's Information Risk Insights Study
Cyentia Institute. “Information Risk Insights Study.” 2026. https://www.cyentia.com/iris2025/.
Loss Magnitude (LM) answers a fundamental question in risk analysis: "If this threat succeeds, how much will it cost us?" Loss Magnitude combines with Loss Event Frequency to produce annualized risk—a dollar figure that enables direct comparison between different threats and informed decisions about security investments. This rubric provides a structured explanation behind the methodology for calculating Loss Magnitude used during reframing analysis commonly found on this site.
What is IRIS?
The Information Risk Insights Study (IRIS) is produced by the Cyentia Institute and represents one of the largest empirical analyses of cybersecurity incident costs ever conducted. The 2025 edition analyzes over 150,000 real security incidents spanning 2008-2024, providing statistically valid loss distributions across different incident types.
Why Use Empirical Data?
Traditional loss estimation often relies on analyst intuition or arbitrary assumptions. This approach produces inconsistent results and struggles to withstand scrutiny. IRIS provides:
Validated benchmarks based on actual incident costs
Incident-type-specific values reflecting real-world cost differences
Min/Median/Max ranges capturing inherent uncertainty
Defensible figures backed by peer-reviewed research
Baseline Assumptions
All values in this framework assume a typical mid-market organization:
Revenue: $10M-$100M annually
Security posture: Average maturity (some controls, some gaps)
Location: US-based (regulatory environment affects fines)
Industry: General commercial (not highly regulated)
If the organization being analyzed differs significantly from this profile—Fortune 500 enterprise, healthcare provider, financial institution, small business—adjust expectations accordingly and note the deviation in your own analysis.
The Five-Step Process
Loss Magnitude calculation follows five sequential steps:
Step | Purpose | Quality Points |
1 | Select the appropriate incident type table | 20 |
2 | Determine which loss categories apply | 15 |
3 | Apply table values with justifications | 25 |
4 | Calculate total Loss Magnitude | 20 |
5 | Calculate annualized Risk | 20 |
Total | 100 |
Each step builds on the previous one. Errors in early steps propagate forward, making careful attention to Steps 1 and 2 particularly important. The quality points are used for the following reasons:
To determine the quality of the reframed information. Some artifacts analyzed on this site (e.g., data breach notifications via media sources that do not contain concise or detailed information regarding the event).
To allow for audit of low quality artifacts versus high quality artifacts.
As a filter for separating out low quality artifacts/analysis from high quality artifacts/analysis
Step 1: Select Incident Type Table (20 Quality Points)
Purpose
Different incident types produce dramatically different cost profiles. A ransomware attack has a median cost of $3.2 million while an accidental data exposure averages $6,900 to $200,000. Using a single "average cyber incident" cost would produce misleading results.
This step matches the threat being analyzed to the appropriate cost table.
The Seven Incident Types
TABLE A: RANSOMWARE/EXTORTION
IRIS Benchmark: Median $3.2M, 90th percentile $27.6M
Use when the threat encrypts data and demands payment, or threatens to leak stolen data unless paid.
Indicators:
Ransomware deployment or encryption
Ransom demands or extortion notes
Double extortion tactics (encrypt and threaten leak)
Ransomware-as-a-Service infrastructure
Examples: LockBit deployment, Cl0p campaign, REvil extortion
Do NOT use for: APT espionage (even if data is stolen), intrusions without ransom demands
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $300,000 | $800,000 | $3,000,000 |
Response | $800,000 | $2,000,000 | $8,000,000 |
Replacement | $100,000 | $300,000 | $1,200,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $50,000 | $100,000 | $500,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $50,000 | $150,000 | $600,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $100,000 | $300,000 | $1,200,000 |
Reputation | $100,000 | $250,000 | $1,000,000 |
TABLE B: SYSTEM INTRUSION
IRIS Benchmark: Median $1.3M, 90th percentile $7.4M
Use when the threat involves unauthorized access for espionage, persistent access, or data theft—without ransomware.
Indicators:
APT activity or nation-state attribution
Non-ransomware malware deployment
Credential harvesting or theft
Backdoors and command-and-control infrastructure
Supply chain compromise
Zero-day exploitation
Examples: Chinese APT campaign, SolarWinds-style attack, corporate espionage, credential harvesting operation
Do NOT use for: Ransomware (Table A), accidental exposure (Table C)
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $100,000 | $300,000 | $1,000,000 |
Response | $300,000 | $800,000 | $3,000,000 |
Replacement | $50,000 | $150,000 | $600,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $25,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $25,000 | $75,000 | $300,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $50,000 | $150,000 | $600,000 |
Reputation | $50,000 | $125,000 | $500,000 |
TABLE C: DATA EXPOSURE (Accidental/Misconfiguration)
IRIS Benchmark: Median $6.9K-$200K, 90th percentile $1.6M
Use when data is exposed through human error or misconfiguration—not malicious external attack.
Indicators:
Misconfigured cloud storage (open S3 bucket)
Accidental email to wrong recipient
Lost or stolen device
Unprotected database exposed to internet
Non-malicious insider error
Examples: Open S3 bucket discovery, employee emails sensitive file to wrong person, laptop left in taxi
Do NOT use for: Malicious insider (Table F), external hacking (Table B)
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $5,000 | $15,000 | $75,000 |
Response | $30,000 | $100,000 | $400,000 |
Replacement | $15,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $10,000 | $35,000 | $150,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $10,000 | $30,000 | $125,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $5,000 | $20,000 | $80,000 |
Reputation | $5,000 | $15,000 | $60,000 |
TABLE D: DENIAL OF SERVICE / SYSTEM FAILURE
IRIS Benchmark: Median $600K-$1M, 90th percentile $5M
Use when the primary impact is disrupting availability rather than stealing data.
Indicators:
DDoS attacks
Service disruption campaigns
Infrastructure targeting
Website defacement
Availability-focused attacks
Examples: DDoS against financial services, hacktivist defacement, infrastructure sabotage
Do NOT use for: Ransomware (Table A)—even though it causes downtime, use Table A
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $200,000 | $500,000 | $2,000,000 |
Response | $150,000 | $400,000 | $1,500,000 |
Replacement | $25,000 | $75,000 | $300,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $10,000 | $25,000 | $100,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $10,000 | $30,000 | $125,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $25,000 | $75,000 | $300,000 |
Reputation | $50,000 | $150,000 | $600,000 |
TABLE E: FRAUD/SCAM (BEC, Wire Fraud)
IRIS Benchmark: Median $300K-$500K, 90th percentile $3M
Use when social engineering tricks victims into directly transferring money or assets.
Indicators:
Business email compromise (BEC)
Invoice fraud or payment redirection
Wire transfer scams
CEO fraud or executive impersonation
Payroll diversion
Examples: Fake vendor invoice, spoofed CEO wire transfer request, payroll diversion scam
Do NOT use for: Phishing leading to malware (Table B), ransomware payments (Table A)
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $25,000 | $75,000 | $300,000 |
Response | $50,000 | $150,000 | $600,000 |
Replacement | $10,000 | $30,000 | $125,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $15,000 | $45,000 | $175,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $15,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $10,000 | $30,000 | $125,000 |
Reputation | $25,000 | $75,000 | $300,000 |
TABLE F: INSIDER MISUSE (Malicious)
IRIS Benchmark: Median $280K, 90th percentile $1.9M
Use when a trusted insider intentionally abuses access for unauthorized purposes.
Indicators:
Privilege abuse by employee or contractor
Data theft before departure
Selling access credentials
IT administrator sabotage
Intentional policy violation for personal gain
Examples: Employee stealing customer database before resigning, contractor selling access, IT admin deleting systems after termination
Do NOT use for: Accidental insider error (Table C), external attacker using stolen credentials (Table B)
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $15,000 | $50,000 | $200,000 |
Response | $40,000 | $125,000 | $500,000 |
Replacement | $20,000 | $60,000 | $250,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $15,000 | $45,000 | $175,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $15,000 | $45,000 | $175,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $30,000 | $90,000 | $350,000 |
Reputation | $20,000 | $60,000 | $250,000 |
TABLE G: GENERAL DEFAULT (Unknown/Hybrid)
IRIS Benchmark: Median $603K, 95th percentile $32M
Use when the incident type is unclear, spans multiple categories, or doesn't fit other tables.
Indicators:
Vague "cyber attack" language without specifics
Hybrid attacks without dominant type
Third-party vendor breach
Insufficient detail to categorize
Examples: News report saying "Company X was hacked" with no details, vendor breach affecting organization
Do NOT use for: Incidents that clearly fit another table—G is the fallback, not the default
Primary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Productivity | $100,000 | $275,000 | $1,100,000 |
Response | $200,000 | $550,000 | $2,200,000 |
Replacement | $40,000 | $110,000 | $450,000 |
Fines & Judgments (1°) | $25,000 | $65,000 | $250,000 |
Secondary Losses:
Loss Type | Min | Median | Max |
Fines & Judgments (2°) | $25,000 | $70,000 | $275,000 |
Competitive Advantage | $40,000 | $115,000 | $450,000 |
Reputation | $35,000 | $100,000 | $400,000 |
Decision Guide for Ambiguous Cases
On rare occasions it is not possible to determine the exact table to use. In cases where the information within the artifact leads to a lack of determination the following table is consulted to determine a final ruling.
Situation | Guidance |
Multiple attack types possible | Use highest-impact applicable table |
Attack chain (phishing leading to ransomware) | Use end-state table (ransomware = Table A) |
Vague "cyber attack" with no details | Use Table G |
Third-party breach affecting organization | Use Table G |
Nation-state, espionage, supply chain | Use Table B |
Website defacement | Use Table D |
Physical theft of devices | Use Table C |
Phishing leading to malware | Use Table B |
Phishing leading to wire transfer | Use Table E |
Step 1 Quality Scoring Criteria
Score | Criteria |
20 | Correct table selected; rationale clearly maps threat characteristics to table criteria; decision guide followed when ambiguous |
15 | Correct table selected; adequate rationale with minor gaps |
10 | Correct table selected; rationale weak, generic, or missing |
5 | Incorrect table but rationale shows reasonable (though flawed) logic |
0 | Incorrect table with no rationale, or selection contradicts threat evidence |
Common Errors
Selecting Table A for APT campaigns without ransomware
Selecting Table G when a specific table clearly applies
Using Table B for accidental data exposure
Confusing phishing-as-delivery with fraud (phishing leading to malware = Table B; phishing leading to wire transfer = Table E)
Step 2: Determine Applicable Loss Categories (15 Quality Points)
Purpose
Not every incident activates every loss category. A DDoS attack causes productivity loss but probably not regulatory fines. This step identifies which cost categories apply based on the specific threat's characteristics.
The Four Identification Items
Before applying triggers, identify four characteristics from the threat analysis:
Data types targeted: What data does the threat pursue? (credentials, PII, financial records, trade secrets, healthcare data, etc.)
Exfiltration capability: Can the threat steal data and move it outside the organization? (yes/no)
Ransomware/extortion: Does the threat involve ransom demands or extortion? (yes/no)
Public disclosure likely: Will this incident probably become public knowledge? Consider: regulatory notification requirements, media interest, threat actor behavior, scope of impact. (yes/no/moderate)
Trigger Logic
The framework uses cascading triggers. Every breach activates baseline categories, and additional conditions activate additional categories:
Trigger Condition | Categories Activated |
Any breach (always) | Productivity (Primary), Response (Primary) |
PII or financial data targeted | + Replacement (Primary) |
Regulated data OR ransomware | + Fines & Judgments (Primary) |
Data exfiltration + likely disclosure | + Competitive Advantage (Secondary), Reputation (Secondary) |
Ransomware/extortion specifically | + Fines & Judgments (Secondary), Reputation (Secondary) |
Understanding the Loss Categories
Primary Losses (direct costs from the incident):
Productivity: Revenue and output lost while systems are unavailable or employees cannot work. Includes business interruption, overtime, and delayed projects.
Response: Investigation, forensics, legal counsel, crisis management, remediation labor, and contractor support. This is often the largest single cost category.
Replacement: Notifying affected individuals, providing credit monitoring, replacing compromised credentials and certificates, and restoring data from backups.
Fines & Judgments (Primary): Regulatory fines, contractual penalties, and legal settlements directly resulting from the breach.
Secondary Losses (indirect and downstream costs):
Fines & Judgments (Secondary): Class action lawsuits, additional regulatory actions, and long-term legal exposure emerging after initial response.
Competitive Advantage: Loss of trade secrets, intellectual property theft impact, and damage to competitive positioning.
Reputation: Customer churn, brand damage, increased customer acquisition costs, stock price impact, and executive credibility loss.
Step 2 Quality Scoring Criteria
Score | Criteria |
15 | All four identification items completed with evidence; triggers correctly applied; categories activated match trigger logic exactly |
12 | Categories correctly activated; minor omissions in identification items |
8 | Most categories correct; 1-2 errors in trigger application |
4 | Multiple errors in category activation; triggers misapplied |
0 | Categories activated without reference to triggers; identification items missing |
Common Errors
Activating Secondary Fines & Judgments without ransomware/extortion present
Missing Replacement when PII or financial data is clearly targeted
Activating Reputation and Competitive Advantage without exfiltration plus likely disclosure
Skipping the four identification items and jumping directly to categories
Step 3: Apply Table Values (25 points)
Purpose
This step builds the actual loss calculation by taking the selected table (Step 1) and activated categories (Step 2) and documenting the specific dollar values with justifications tied to the threat.
How to Apply Values
Use ONLY the table selected in Step 1
For each loss category in the table:
If activated in Step 2: Mark "Y", use the table's Min/Median/Max values, provide justification
If NOT activated in Step 2: Mark "N", enter $0 for all values
Justifications must reference specific evidence from the threat analysis
Sum applicable rows for Primary Total and Secondary Total
Writing Effective Justifications
Justifications explain WHY this category applies to THIS specific threat. They should reference particular TTPs, capabilities, or characteristics from the threat analysis.
Good justification: "Multi-environment investigation required (browser extensions, MSHTA, WScript, .NET loaders); LOLBins usage complicates forensic analysis and extends remediation timeline"
Poor justification: "Response costs will be incurred"
The poor example is too generic—it applies to any incident and provides no insight into why this specific threat drives these costs.
Poor justification: [blank]
Missing justifications suggest the analyst hasn't connected the loss estimate to the actual threat.
Step 3 Quality Scoring Criteria
Score | Criteria |
25 | Correct table values; Y/N markings match Step 2 exactly; threat-specific justifications for each applicable category; $0 for non-applicable categories; arithmetic correct |
20 | Correct values and Y/N markings; justifications adequate but somewhat generic |
15 | Correct values; minor Y/N errors or some justifications missing |
10 | Correct table values but multiple Y/N errors or justifications disconnected from threat |
5 | Wrong table values OR significant application errors |
0 | Values fabricated, wrong table entirely, or section missing |
Common Errors
Using values from wrong table
Marking "Y" for categories not activated in Step 2 (or vice versa)
Generic justifications not tied to specific threat
Arithmetic errors in totals
Forgetting $0 for non-applicable categories
Step 4: Calculate Total Loss Magnitude (20 Quality Points)
Purpose
This step combines Primary and Secondary totals into final Loss Magnitude figures and validates the result against IRIS benchmarks.
The Calculation
Total LM (Min) = Primary Total (Min) + Secondary Total (Min)
Total LM (Median) = Primary Total (Median) + Secondary Total (Median)
Total LM (Max) = Primary Total (Max) + Secondary Total (Max)Required Summary Elements
After calculating totals, complete five summary elements:
Table Used: Which table (A-G) and its name
Primary losses driven by: Which TTPs or threat characteristics drive primary costs
Secondary losses driven by: Which TTPs or threat characteristics drive secondary costs
Excluded categories: Which categories were NOT activated and why
Baseline validation: Does the calculated total fall within IRIS benchmark range?
Baseline Validation Reference
Table | Expected Median | Expected Maximum |
A - Ransomware | ~$3.2M | Should not exceed ~$30M |
B - System Intrusion | ~$1.3M | Should not exceed ~$10M |
C - Data Exposure | ~$200K or less | Should not exceed ~$2M |
D - Denial of Service | ~$800K | Should not exceed ~$6M |
E - Fraud/Scam | ~$400K | Should not exceed ~$4M |
F - Insider Misuse | ~$280K | Should not exceed ~$2M |
G - General Default | ~$600K | Wide range acceptable |
If calculated LM falls significantly outside these ranges, explain why (unusual threat characteristics, highly regulated industry, etc.) or revisit calculations.
Step 4 Scoring Criteria
Score | Criteria |
20 | Arithmetic correct for all three columns; all five summary elements present; baseline validation performed |
16 | Arithmetic correct; 4 of 5 summary elements present; baseline validation present |
12 | Arithmetic correct; 2-3 summary elements; baseline validation missing |
8 | Minor arithmetic errors; summary sparse |
4 | Significant arithmetic errors; summary missing |
0 | Totals incorrect or section missing |
Common Errors
Arithmetic errors summing Primary + Secondary
Missing summary elements
Skipping baseline validation
Claiming validation passes when numbers clearly exceed benchmarks
Step 5: Calculate Risk (20 Quality Points)
Purpose
This step combines Loss Magnitude with Loss Event Frequency (LEF) from earlier analysis to produce annualized risk—expected dollar loss per year.
Required Inputs
From earlier analysis, you need:
LEF (low): Lower bound of expected successful attacks per year
LEF (high): Upper bound of expected successful attacks per year
From Step 4, you have:
LM (min): Lower bound of loss per incident
LM (median): Central estimate of loss per incident
LM (max): Upper bound of loss per incident
The Calculations
Three Scenarios:
Low Risk = LEF (low) × LM (min)
Mid Risk = LEF (mid) × LM (median)
High Risk = LEF (high) × LM (max)
Where: LEF (mid) = (LEF low + LEF high) / 2Most Likely Estimate (MLE):
MLE = √(LEF low × LEF high) × LM (median)The MLE uses geometric mean rather than arithmetic mean because loss distributions are typically lognormal (skewed right with a long tail of extreme outcomes). Geometric mean provides a better central estimate for skewed data.
Understanding the Outputs
Low scenario: Best case—fewer attacks succeed, each costs less
High scenario: Worst case—more attacks succeed, each costs more
Mid scenario: Arithmetic midpoint of the range
MLE: Statistically most likely outcome given typical loss distributions
For decision-making:
Use the range to communicate uncertainty to stakeholders
Use MLE for budget planning and control prioritization
Use High for worst-case planning and insurance decisions
Step 5 Quality Scoring Criteria
Score | Criteria |
20 | LEF values from prior analysis; all scenarios calculated correctly; MLE uses geometric mean formula; units include "/year" |
16 | Calculations correct; MLE present but formula not shown |
12 | Low/Mid/High correct; MLE missing or incorrect |
8 | Arithmetic errors in 1-2 scenarios; MLE missing |
4 | Multiple calculation errors |
0 | Calculations wrong or section missing |
Common Errors
Using LEF values that don't match earlier analysis
Arithmetic multiplication errors
Confusing geometric mean (MLE) with arithmetic mean (Mid)
Omitting "/year" units
Using LM median for all scenarios instead of min/median/max
Interpretation
After completing calculations, provide a one-sentence interpretation that:
References the target organization profile
States the key dollar figure (typically MLE)
Explains what drives the risk
Notes if the organization differs significantly from baseline assumptions
Example: "For a typical mid-market organization in the manufacturing sector, annualized risk exposure from this threat is approximately $2.3M, driven primarily by expected forensic investigation costs and credential remediation following multiple intrusion attempts per year."
Scoring Summary
Step | Description | Points |
1 | Incident Type Table Selection | 20 |
2 | Loss Category Determination | 15 |
3 | Table Value Application | 25 |
4 | Total LM Calculation | 20 |
5 | Risk Calculation | 20 |
Total | 100 |
Grade Scale
Score | Grade | Meaning |
90-100 | Excellent | Accurate, well-justified, follows framework precisely |
80-89 | Good | Minor errors or omissions; analysis is reliable |
70-79 | Acceptable | Some errors but core logic sound; usable with review |
60-69 | Needs Improvement | Multiple errors; requires revision |
Below 60 | Unacceptable | Fundamental errors; should be redone |
Quick Reference Checklist
Step 1: Table Selection
Correct table selected (A-G)
Rationale provided
Rationale maps threat evidence to table criteria
Decision guide followed if ambiguous
Step 2: Category Determination
Data types targeted identified
Exfiltration capability identified (yes/no)
Ransomware/extortion identified (yes/no)
Public disclosure likelihood identified
Triggers correctly applied
Activated categories listed
Step 3: Value Application
Values from correct table only
Y/N markings match Step 2 activations
$0 for non-applicable categories
Justifications reference specific threat TTPs
Primary total arithmetic correct
Secondary total arithmetic correct
Step 4: Total LM Calculation
Total = Primary + Secondary (all three columns)
Summary: Table Used
Summary: Primary losses driven by
Summary: Secondary losses driven by
Summary: Excluded categories
Summary: Baseline validation
Step 5: Risk Calculation
LEF values from prior analysis
Low: LEF low × LM min
Mid: LEF mid × LM median
High: LEF high × LM max
LEF mid = (LEF low + LEF high) / 2
MLE = √(LEF low × LEF high) × LM median
Units include "/year"
Interpretation
References target profile
States key dollar figure
Explains risk drivers
Notes baseline deviations if applicable
Conclusion
Loss Magnitude calculation transforms abstract threat information into concrete financial terms. By following this structured methodology with IRIS 2025 empirical data, analysts produce consistent, defensible estimates that support informed risk management decisions.
The five-step process ensures:
Appropriate categorization through incident type selection
Relevant scoping through loss category determination
Empirical grounding through standardized table values
Transparent reasoning through required justifications
Actionable output through annualized risk calculation
When combined with Contact Frequency, Probability of Action, Threat Capability, and Resistance Strength analysis, Loss Magnitude enables comprehensive risk quantification that translates technical threats into business impact.